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Introduction: Moschovakis' Approach to Intensionality
G. Frege introduced two concepts which are central to modern formal approaches to natural language semantics; i.e. the notion of reference (denotation, extension, Bedeutung) and sense (intension, Sinn) of proper names 2 . The sense of a proper name is wherin the mode of presentation (of the denotation) is contained. For Frege proper names include not only expressions such as Peter, Shakespeare but also definite descriptions like the point of intersection of line l 1 and l 2 and furthermore sentences which are names for truth values. Sentences denote the True or the False. The sense of a sentence is the proposition (Gedanke) the sentence expresses. In the tradition of possible world semantics the proposition a sentence expresses is modelled via the set of worlds in which the sentence is true. This strategy leads to well known problems with propositional attitudes and other intensional constructions in natural languages since it predicts for example that the sentences in (1) are equivalent.
( 1) a. Jacob knows that the square root of four equals two. b. Jacob knows that any group G is isomorphic to a transformation group.
Even an example as simple as (1) shows that the standard concept of proposition in possible world semantics is not a faithful reconstruction of Freges notion sense.
Frege developed his notion of sense for two related but conceptually different reasons. We already introduced the first one by considering propositional attitudes. The problem here is how to develop a general concept which can handle the semantics of Frege's ungerade Rede. The second problem is how to distinguish a statement like a = a which is rather uninformative from the informative statement a = b or phrased differently how to account for the semantic difference between (2-a) and (2-b) . (2) a. Scott is Scott. b. Scott is the author of Waverly.
Frege's intuitive concept of sense therefore was meant both to model information and provide denotations for intensional constructions. [13] develops a formal analysis of sense and denotation which is certainly closer to Frege's intentions than is possible world semantics. Moschovakis' motivations are (at least) twofold. The first motivation is to give a rigorous definition of the concept algorithm ( [14] ) and thereby provide the basics for a mathematical theory of algorithms. The second motivation is a philosophical and linguistic one. It consists in providing a more adequate formal reconstruction of the Fregean notions sense and denotation via the formalised concepts algorithm and value of an algorithm. Such a formalisation has a wide range of potential applications. We already mentioned propositional attitudes and other intensional constructions in natural language, but these formalised concepts could also contribute to a better understanding of such difficult notions like synonymy or faithful translation familiar from philosophical discussions.
Let us briefly explain the intuitive basis of Moschovakis' new approach to intensionality. Assume that a first-order (sorted) structure A for the Formal Language of Recursion (FLR) is given. The first step consists in recursively defining a denotation den A (x, φ) with respect to A, where φ be an FLR-formula all of whose free variables are among x.
In the second step an intension int A (x, φ) is defined for φ. The intuition is that int A (x, φ) is the algorithm which computes den A (x, φ).
int A (x, φ) = the algorithm which computes the truth value of φ. Of course it is this definition of intension which is novel. It is developed in a rather indirect way via a syntactic reduction calculus which step by step transforms a given formula φ into the parts it consists of. The transformation process ends when only those parts of φ are left whose denotations are given by the structure A. In this case one says that the formula φ has been reduced to its normal form. It is the existence and uniqueness of normal forms for FLR-formulas which allows the recursive definition of intension in [12] , and which justifies speaking of the intension in the definition of int A (x, φ).
In the rest of this section we will explain the basic ideas of Moscchovakis' approach to intensionality. This will be done in a rather informal and sketchy way with emphasis on ideas rather than on technical details. The reader interested in a more thorough understanding of the formal theory is urged to consult Moschovakis' work, primarily [13] , [11] and [12] .
We will concentrate on the presentation in [13] which introduces the language LPCR (Lower Predicate Calculus with Reflection). LPCR is a simplified version of the formal language of recursion FLR developed in [11] .
Apart from the logical symbols eq (equality), ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ∃ and ∀ LPCR contains k-ary partial relation variables P k 1 , P k 2 , . . . , thought of as partial functions from the k-ary Cartesian product into the truth values. As a special case -when k = 0 -we obtain the formula P (). The novel feature of LPCR is a new variable binding operator rec introduced in [11] . The syntax of this operator is given by (the types are omitted here): Definition 1. If u 1 , . . . , u n are individual variables, if p 1 , . . . , p n are distinct partial function (pf ) variables and if φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , φ n are formulas, then
is a formula. The formulas φ 0 , . . . , φ n are called the parts of the recursive formula φ. The formula φ 0 is the output or head part.
In LPCR the following more intuitive notation is used (where the φ i s are formulas):
One may give a denotational semantics of LCPR relative to a many sorted functional structure A which contains basic sets, Cartesion products, domains for partial functions from Cartesian products of basic sets to basic sets and further domains for partial monotone functions from Cartesian products of basic and partial function spaces to basic sets. Moreover such a structure provides denotations for the logical constants eq, ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ∃ and ∀.
Given a functional structure A, it is possible to define by induction a partial monotone functional den A (x, φ) : X → T V which assigns to each formula φ and each x its truth value in A. Here X is the space of all ntuples (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of objects 4 in A corresponding to the variables in x and T V is the set of truth values. We will skip here the definitions which fix the standard denotations of terms and concentrate on the clause for the new operator rec. Consider
For each x, the induction hypothesis gives us a sequence of partial monotone functionals f x,φ i satisfying for i = 0, . . . , n:
Since all f x,φ i are monotone it follows that the system of equations
has a (unique) sequence of least fixpoints p x,1 ,. . . , p x,n as solutions. The denotation of rec(u 1 , p 1 , . . . , u n , p n )[φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . , φ n ] is then obtained by substituting these fixpoints for the respective variables in φ 0 , i.e. by setting
. 3 Since the denotational semantics for FLR is a partial semantics u v denotes identity for the case where both terms u and v are defined. 4 We will use the same notation for variables and the objects which interpret the variables here.
This concludes the brief exposition of the denotational semantics of LPCR. What makes LPCR so interesting is that Moschovakis also provides an intensional semantics, that is, a semantics which assigns to each formula φ and each x an intension int A (x, φ), a kind of abstract recursive algorithm which computes the denotation den A (x, φ). The theory of (referential) intensions is developed in [12] . The central concept is that of a recursor.
Definition 2.
A recursor on a set X to W is any tuple of partial monotone functionals f = [f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f n ] such that the following equations are correctly typed:
The functionals f 0 , . . . , f n are called the parts of f and f : X → W is called the denotation of the recursor f .
One says that two recursors f and g are equal if they have the same number of parts n and for some permutation σ of {0, . . . , n} with σ(0) = 0 and inverse σ −1 the following holds:
The definition of equality for recursors thus says that changing the order of any parts of a recursor with the exception of the first part does not change the identity of the recursor.
The aim of the intensional semantics for LPCR is both to interpret the intension int A (x, φ) as a recursor, and to let int A (x, φ) compute den A (x, φ). It is readily seen that algorithms which compute den A (x, φ) will involve nested recursions, and one of Moschovakis' technical achievements is to supply a reduction calculus which reduces nested recursions to an unnested normal form. The reduction calculus axiomatises two relations between LPCR formulas. The first is t ∼ s, with the intended meaning that t and s define the same abstract algorithm. The second relation is t → s which means that s defines the algorithm more directly (in terms of already given information) than t. Moreover, the uniqueness of normal forms of the reduction calculus allows one to assign to every expression of LPCR a recursor as intension in a unique way. We will illustrate these ideas by means of a few linguistic examples.
Assume first that LPCR is enriched by a construction (the x)φ(x) which assigns to every formula a term. The denotation of this new construction with respect to a structure A is given by the functional the A which assigns to every partial function f : A → T V from the domain A to the set of truthvalues a unique object in A. We can then translate the sentences (2-a) and (2-b) repeated here for convenience as (3-a) and (3-b) into the formalism of LPCR. (3) a. Scott is Scott. b. Scott is the author of Waverly.
Possible LPCR representations are (4-a) and (4-b) where s is an individual constant and AW is a one-place predicate representing the expression author of Waverly. We assume that the interpretation of AW is given by a set of structure A.
The reduction calculus allows to derive the following (rough) normal forms for formulas (4-a), (4-b) .
It is clear that the normal forms (5-a) and (5-a) represent different recursors. Therefore the intensions assigned to the sentences (3-a) (3-b) are different although their denotation might well be the same; namely if in the structure A Scott is indeed the unique author of Waverly. As a second application consider relations R and Q which are interpreted as converse relations on structure A. The reduction calculus allows to derive the following normal forms for R(a, b) and Q(b, a).
Given that R and Q are interpreted as given (intensionless) converse relations on the structure A, the intensions of R(a, b) and Q(b, a) are the same by the definition of equality for recursors (take a permutation σ with σ(1) = 2 and σ(2) = 1). Therefore if we choose to interpret the passive as the converse of the corresponding active relation we derive that the sentences John hit Mary and Mary was hit by John express the same intension. We have seen one example where intensions are different, and one example where they are the same. In a letter to Husserl, Frege remarked on this topic It seems to me that we must have an objective criterion for recognising a thought as the same thought, since without such a criterion a logical analysis is not possible.
Moschovakis supplies a significant theoretical insight concerning the identity relation ∼ A between intensions on an appropriate structure A. The result says that the intensional identity relation is decidable. For a precise statement we need the following definition: Definition 3. For each structure A and arbitrary integers n, m, let S A (n, m) ⇐⇒ n, m are Gödel numbers of sentences θ n , θ m of LPCR and θ n ∼ A θ m .
The precise formulation of the main theorem from [13] is: Theorem 1. For each recursor structure A of finite signature, the relation S A (n, m) between Gödel numbers of formulas of LPCR interpreted on A is decidable.
A corollary of theorem 1 is that the relation S A (n, m) is definable in LPCR over each structure which allows the coding necessary for Gödelisation. (This requires just pairing and projection functions.)
This result brings us to our third linguistic application. Moschovakis gives an analysis of propositional attitudes which goes far beyond the usual accounts in possible world semantics. Consider the following example from [13] . (7) Othello believed that Cassio and Desdemona were lovers.
According to Frege the propositional attitude believed relates Othello not to the denotation of the sentence Cassio and Desdemona were lovers but to its sense. Technically this amounts to analyse example (7) as Othello believed m where m is the Gödel number of the sentence Cassio and Desdemona were lovers. It is now possible to formulate a principle which says within LPCR that belief is sensitive not to syntactic form but to sense.
If we assume that conjunction is interpreted on the structure A by a commutative operation -which means that the formulas φ ∧ ψ and ψ ∧ φ express the same intension with respect to A -then sentence (9) follows from (7).
(9) Othello believed that Desdemona and Cassio were lovers.
This concludes our brief exposition of Moschovakis' notion of intension. We believe that this notion is highly relevant to the semantics of natural language, but that it has to be recast in a different formal framework to yield all that it promises. To put it roughly, whereas Moschovakis' emphasis is on how grammatical constructions affect intension, our emphasis will be on intension at the lexical level. The next section will explain the reasons for this shift of emphasis.
Meaning and logic programming
For reasons that will become gradually clear, it is advantageous to represent the meaning of a set of natural language expressions by means of a constraint logic program involving those expressions. We will now explain how Moschovakis' ideas can be transferred to this context.
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At the most general level, the correspondence is this. Let P be some logic program, consisting of a number of clauses of the form θ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ θ k → ϕ. For example, in the case of Prolog, the θ i , ϕ are atomic; in the case of a general logic program, embodying full negation as failure, the θ i may also be negations of atoms. Considering the latter case, it has turned out that a proper semantics for negation as failure involves Kleene's (strong) three valued logic applied to the completion of a program. The completion can be viewed as a set of simultaneous recursion equations; likewise, solutions to these equations are obtained as fixed points of suitable monotone operators (for general logic programs, three-valued consequence operators). Thus, the meaning of a natural language expression is given by a set of recursion equations (in a suitable logic programming language); denotations are obtained from fixed point solutions of these equations.
In formal semantics for natural language it is not common practice to associate algorithms to expressions. We have seen that it is usually assumed that all one needs is the intension of an expression, defined as a function which maps a possible world into an extension of the expression in that possible world. It seems to us that this picture of meaning is too static, and by and large cognitively irrelevant. A phenomenon that is very difficult to capture in terms of the traditional notion of meaning is nonmonotonicity. Recall that a consequence relation |= is nonmonotonic if ψ |= ϕ does not imply ψ, θ |= ϕ. Natural language abounds with nonmonotonic phenomena. For instance, the distinction between (10) John crossed the street and (11) John was crossing the street is that from (10) it follows that John reached the other side, whereas this is only implied by default by (11) . One can add the clause 'when he was hit by a truck' to (11), but not to (10) . When we think of the denotation of 'cross the street' as an event, then the temporal extent of the event described by (11) is cut short by the addition of the clause 'when he was hit by a truck'. 6 Native speakers of English do this automatically. This suggests an algorithmic interpretation process whereby the denotation of an expression is constantly re-computed on the basis of incoming data (linguistic or otherwise). The algorithm might work in such a way that it always computes a minimal model compatible with the present data; 'minimal' in the sense that nothing is assumed beyond what is given by the data. This point bears some elaboration. Both monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning start from the maxim:
(M) 'assume only what is given in the premisses' but they implement (M) in different ways. Nonmonotonic reasoning takes (M) to mean: all existence assumptions beyond those required by the premisses are false; instead, monotonic reasoning interprets (M) as: suspend judgement on statements which do not follow (and whose negations do not follow) from the premisses. In the interesting cases, these two interpretations of (M) can be reformulated as follows. In nonmonotonic reasoning, people construct a minimal model of the premisses (which is often unique); in monotonic reasoning, they must consider all models of the premisses. We believe that the intension or sense of an expression can be profitably identified with an algorithm constructing such minimal models. It remains to find the proper notion of algorithm for this context.
The general logic programs introduced above are not yet general enough for our purposes, mainly due to the fundamental role of time in natural language. For example, in the case of the progressive form ('John is writing') we want to be able to express that the activity write takes place more or less continuously during a certain period of time. We thus need a background structure of time, which for definiteness we take to be the structure (IR, 0, 1, +, ·, <), and hence a version of logic programming which allows one to deal with the reals. In the case at hand, we would like to write a logic program for 'write', which should return as an answer the set of time points at which John is writing in a particular situation, also described in the program. The usual machinery of computed answer substitutions is not very helpful here, as it might present each point in that set as a separate solution. It is much more helpful to have the set represented by means of a definition; in the paradigmatic case, as a finite union of intervals. We have therefore opted for constraint logic programming, to which we now give a very brief introduction (cutting some corners in the process).
Constraint logic programming is in general concerned with the interplay of two languages. Let L be the language {0, 1, +, ·, <}, T the complete theory of (IR, 0, 1, +, ·, <) in L, i.e. the theory of real-closed fields. Let K be another language, consisting of programmed predicate symbols. The constraint programming language CLP (T ) consists on the one hand of constraints, which are first order formulas from the language L, and on the other hand of formulas from K, whose terms come from L.
7 Constraint logic programs differ from logic programs by allowing constraints in the bodies of rules and in queries. For example, primitive constraints in CLP (T ) include formulas of the form s < t and s = t, where s, t are terms from L. Definite constraint logic programs have the form
where the B i , A are atoms in K and c is a constraint. Likewise, a query has the logical form
We shall use the notation ?c, B 1 . . . B m for queries, always with the convention that c denotes the constraint, and that the remaining formulas come from K. The words 'query' and 'goal' will be used interchangeably.
The aim of a constraint computation is to express a programmed predicate symbol entirely in terms of constraints. Thus, unlike the case of ordinary logic programming, the last node of a successful branch in a computation tree contains a constraint instead of the empty clause.
For our purposes, even definite constraint logic programs are not yet expressive enough. We follow [17] in allowing (classical equivalents of) arbitrary first order formulas in the body of program clauses. More precisely, define a complex subgoal recursively to be
, where c is a constraint and each B i is a complex subgoal.
Definition 4.
A complex body is a conjunction of complex subgoals. A normal program is a formula ψ → ϕ of CLP (T ) such that ψ is a complex body and ϕ is a complex subgoal.
If, in the second clause of the above definition, we take x to be empty, we obtain ordinary goals (with constraints), which as indicated will be written as ?c, B 1 . . . B m . The interpretation of negation most congenial to constraint logic programming is constructive negation ( [17] ). In the customary negation as failure paradigm, negative queries differ from positive queries: the latter yield computed answer substitutions, the former only the answers 'true' or 'false'. Constructive negation tries to make the situation more symmetrical by also providing computed answer substitutions for negative queries. Applied to constraint logic programming, this means that both positive and negative queries can start successful computations ending in constraints. As in the case of negation as failure, the fundamental technical tool is the completion of a program:
Definition 5. Let P be a normal program, consisting of clauses
where the p i are atoms.
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The completion of P, denoted by comp(P), is computed by the following recipe:
(1) choose a predicate p that occurs in the head of a clause of P (2) choose a sequence of new variables x of length the arity of p (3) replace in the i-th clause of P all occurrences of a term in t i by a corresponding variable in x and add the conjunct x = t i to the body; we thus obtain
. . , n k enumerate the clauses in which p occurs as head (6) define Def(p) to be the formula
(7) comp(P) is then obtained as the formula p Def (p), where the conjunction ranges over predicates p occurring in the head of a clause of P.
As in the case of negation as failure, the proper logic for negation in constraint logic programming is Kleene's strong three-valued logic with truth values {t, f , u}. Semantic consequence in this logic will be denoted by |= 3 .
By the definition of complex subgoal, ↔ does not occur in normal programs. The occurrence of ↔ in the completion is interpreted in the manner of Lukasiewicz: ϕ ↔ ψ is assigned t when ϕ, ψ are assigned the same truth value in {t, f , u}, and f otherwise. Note the correspondence between this interpretation of ↔ and the use of in recursion theory. Definition 6. A partial interpretation I is a function which maps ground atoms (in P) to {t, f , u}, and constraints to {t, f } Definition 7. Given a normal program P, a real-closed field A, a partial interpretation I and a ground atom A, the (immediate) consequence operator Φ P is defined as (1) Φ P (I)(A) = t if there exists a clause B ∧ c → p(s) in P and an assignment α into A such that A = p(s)α and I(cα) = I(Bα) = t.
and each assignment α into A such that A = p(s)α:
Φ P is monotone, hence has a (least) fixed point, but in general its closure ordinal is not ω (as it would be for Horn clause programs) but can be anything below ω CK 1 . Nevertheless, there exist useful general soundness and completeness theorems, which in essence go back to a saturation argument due to Kunen ([8] ). The basic idea is that the closure ordinal is still ω if the underlying structure is recursively saturated. A fully accurate formulation of these theorems would require us to give a definition of the appropriate derivation trees. For this, we refer the reader to [17] . In terms of these trees, one has Theorem 2. Let T be the theory of real-closed fields, P a normal program, ?c, G a query.
(1) ?c, G succeeds iff
Here, ∀(∃) denotes universal (existential) closure.
At this stage it may seem far from clear why such an involved formalism is necessary, or even useful, to represent meaning in natural language. However, a glance at our main semantic tool, the event calculus (to be presented in section 3), will show that constraint logic programming is actually tailormade for this application. We will motivate the introduction of the event calculus by means of a brief discussion of the semantics of verbs.
Ontology for verb-semantics and the event calculus
Speaking intuitively, a verb denotes a kind of event. In slightly more detail,we may think of that event as being parametrised by the subject, direct object and indirect object of the verb (when appplicable). But what are events? Consider one of the most complex classes of verbs, the so-called accomplishments, of which examples are 'draw a circle', 'write a letter', 'cross the street'. Events representing such verbs have an elaborate internal structure. On the one hand there is an activity taking place (draw, write, cross), on the other hand an 'object' is being 'constructed': the circle, the letter, or the path across the street.
In this vein, Dowty (in [2] ) analyses the progressivised accomplishment that is, the sentence is decomposed into an activity ('Mary draws something') and a partial, changing, object ('circle'). Furthermore, an activity naturally comes with events marking the beginning or end of that activity. We can see from this example that a rather baroque ontology is necessary to account for the semantics of verbs.
(1) individuals (2) real numbers, both to represent time and to code 'stages' of partial objects (3) time-dependent properties, such as activities (4) changing partial objects (5) events, marking the beginning and end of time-dependent properties. Both time-dependent properties and changing partial objects can be brought under the heading of a fluent.
9 A fluent is a function which may contain variables for individuals and reals, and which is interpreted in a model as a set of time points. Events will be taken in the sense of event types, from which tokens are obtained by anchoring the event type to a time point (sometimes also to an interval).
The literature contains several formalisms for reasoning about events, which have their roots in planning systems in artificial intelligence. It has been suggested several times that such formalisms might be useful for the semantics of natural language, although [6] seems to be the first paper where the actual computations are done. We borrow the basic format from [15] , although the computational tools will be different.
Given this ontology, the following choice of basic predicates seems natural. We want to be able to say that fluents are initiated and terminated by events, or that a fluent was true at the beginning of time. If f is a variable over fluents, e a variable over events, and t a variable over time points, we may write the required predicates as (1) Initially(f ) (2) Happens(e, t) (3) Initiates(e, f, t) (4) Terminates(e, f, t) These predicates are to be interpreted in such a way, that if Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t), then f will begin to hold after (but not at) t; if Happens(e, t) ∧ Terminates(e, f, t), then f will still hold at t. Strictly speaking this convention makes sense only for events which are not extended in time. For the general case one needs some axioms additional to those presented below; we will omit these for the sake of simplicity.
The possibility of having changing partial objects requires its own special predicates, namely 5 Trajectory(f 1 , t, f 2 , d) 6 Releases(e, f, t) We have seen above that an activity, while it is going on, may change a partial object. The first predicate in the above list embodies this. Here, one should think of f 1 as an activity, and of f 2 as a certain stage of a partial object. The predicate then expresses that if f 1 holds from t until t + d, then at t + d, f 2 holds. In applications, f 2 will have a real argument, and will be of the form f 2 (g(t + d)) for some continuous function g. The predicate Releases is necessary to cancel the effect of those axioms of the 9 The name is appropriated from Newton's treatise on the calculus, where all variables are assumed to depend implicitly on time.
event calculus which intend to express the so-called 'principle of inertia': 'normally, nothing changes'.
These axioms have the form: if there are no f -relevant events between t 1 and t 2 , then the truth value of f at t 1 is the same as that at t 2 . We introduce two special predicates for f -relevant events. The first predicate expresses that there is a terminating or releasing event between t 1 and t 2 ; the second predicate expresses that there is an initiating or releasing event between t 1 and t 2 .
7 Clipped(t 1 , f, t 2 ) 8 Declipped(t 1 , f, t 2 ) Lastly, we need the truth predicate 9 HoldsAt(f, t). In the usual set-up of the event calculus, it is only said that HoldsAt is a truth predicate; the defining axioms for the truth predicate are lacking. In planning applications of the event calculus, fluents are typically derived from first order formulas in a language disjoint from that of the event calculus itself. 'Derive' here refers to an operation which transforms formulas into terms, for example, Gödelisation, or what in AI is termed reification. It is of course easy to declare a two-valued truth predicate applying to such fluents only. However, once the fluents are codes of formulas which may also contain predicates from the event calculus, this becomes problematic, and in that case one needs to add a logic program for the truth predicate to the event calculus. The proper logic for such a truth predicate is again Kleene's strong three-valued logic. We do not know of any planning application which needs this generality, but, as explained in [6] , for a semantics of natural language this generality is essential. Gödelisation or reification is the formal counterpart of the syntactic operation of nominalisation, and when this procedure is iterated, as in (14) My father objecting to my not going to church the truth conditions for sentences involving this expression involve nested occurrences of HoldsAt as well. These observations notwithstanding, in the interest of brevity and legibility we shall not add a truth theory, and we shall assume some external interpreter available which relates a fluent to the formula (not containing predicates of the event calculus) from which it derives. All in all, we then have Definition 8. An EC-structure is a many-sorted structure of the form Here is an example of how the language may be put to work: the formalisation of accomplishments. Keeping in mind Dowty's analysis, one can see that we need at least the following (1) a cause-fluent f 1 (an activity, possibly containing variables for individuals) (2) a fluent representing a partial object f 2 (x), where x ∈ IR + (i.e the set of nonnegative reals), (3) a function g : IR + −→ IR + These objects should satisfy the following formula
In words: if the cause f 1 exerts its influence uninterruptedly from t until t + d, at t + d the state of the partial object will be f 2 (g(t + d)).
Apart from this we also need to include a culminating event, and a consequent state which follows upon the heels of the culminating event. These latter two parts will be illustrated in the detailed scenario for an accomplishment to be given below.
Formulas such as this capture part of the lexical meaning of a verb. In order to derive predictions, e.g. on when the drawing of the circle will be completed, one needs additional formulas, conveniently divided in axioms, holding for every situation, and a scenario, laying down properties of a particular situation.
The axioms of the event calculus given below are modified from [15] , the difference being due to the fact that we prefer a constraint logic programming approach, whereas Shanahan uses circumscription. In the following, all variables are assumed to be universally quantified.
Axiom 2. Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f, t) ∧ t < t ∧ ¬Clipped(t, f, t ) → HoldsAt(f, t ) Axiom 3. Happens(e, t)∧Terminates(e, f, t)∧ t < t ∧ ¬Declipped(t, f, t ) → ¬HoldsAt(f, t ) Axiom 4. Happens(e, t) ∧ Initiates(e, f 1 , t) ∧ t < t
Axiom 5. Happens(e, s) ∧ t < s < t ∧ (Terminates(e, f, s) ∨ Releases(e, f, s)) → Clipped(t, f, t ) Axiom 6. Happens(e, s) ∧ t < s < t ∧ (Initiates(e, f, s) ∨ Releases(e, f, s)) → Declipped(t, f, t ).
The set of axioms of the event calculus will be abbreviated by EC. In the absence of further axioms, one can construct a model for EC by interpreting fluents as finite unions of halfopen intervals (of the form (a, b]), and assuming that each event either initiates or terminates a fluent, and that fluents are initiated or terminated by events only. The last section of the paper will show that such models are also available in the presence of further sentences, laying down preconditions on Happens and the other primitive predicates.
We see that the axioms form a normal logic program in the sense of CLP (T ), with the constraints of the form s < t. 11 In the logic program, the programmed predicates are HoldsAt, Clipped and Declipped. We also need programs for the remaining primitive predicates. This requires a preliminary definition.
Definition 10. A state S(t) at time t is a complex body (cf. definition 4) involving only
(1) literals of the form (¬)HoldsAt(f, t), for t fixed and possibly different f , (2) equalities between fluent terms, and between event terms (3) formulas in the constraint language L Definition 11. A scenario is a conjunction of statements of the form (1) Initially(f ), or (2) ∀t(S(t) → Initiates(e, f, t)), or (3) ∀t(S(t) → Terminates(e, f, t)), or (4) ∀t(S(t) → Releases(e, f, t)), or (5) ∀t(S(t) → Happens(e, t)), where S(t) is a state in the sense of definition 10. These formulas may contain additional constants for objects 12 , reals or time points and can be prefixed by universal quantifiers over time points, reals and objects.
Applying program-completion (cf. definition 5) to a scenario in the sense of definition 11 entails that the predicates Happens, Initiates and Terminates are definable in terms of HoldsAt. While this is computationally pleasant, it involves a simplification: it may seem more reasonable to also allow Happens to occur in the body of 5, to allow for one event causing another given a precondition. This however introduces an additional loop in the computation, thus possibly affecting termination. In section 5 we shall see that our 11 Axiom 3 may seem an exception but actually this axiom follows from the others using negation as failure. 12 In order the simplify the exposition of the theorems in section 5 we do not allow functions on objects.
main representation theorem indeed fails when the concept of scenario is thus liberalised. An important part of the lexical meaning of a verb is enshrined in the dynamics:
Definition 12. A dynamics is a set of statements of the form
where S(t) is a state in the sense of definition 10, and g is a function definable in the constraint language.
Computing with the event calculus
Given a scenario scen and a dynamics dyn, we now would like to know, preferably effectively, for which t, HoldsAt(f, t), or, more generally, for which (x, t), HoldsAt(f (x), t). Formulated in this way, the question will have mostly trivial answers, because the theory EC+scen+dyn will in general have many models, some of which may contain events and influences of events which are not part of scen. As we have explained above, we are only interested in minimal models, that is, models where intuitively speaking, nothing is true beyond what is given in scen and dyn, and what is forced to be true by EC.
Shanahan [15] uses circumscription (due to McCarthy; cf. [9] for an elaborate exposition) for this purpose.
Definition 13. Let P, Q be predicate symbols of the same arity. Put P = Q := ∀x(P (x) ↔ Q(x)) P ≤ Q := ∀x(P (x) → Q(x)) P < Q := P ≤ Q ∧ ¬(P = Q) Definition 14. Let ϕ(P ) be a sentence containing an occurrence of the predicate symbol P . The circumscription of P in ϕ(P ) is defined as the following formula of second order logic:
where p is a predicate variable of the same arity as P . The resulting formula will be denoted by CIRC[ϕ; P ].
Hence, if S is a finitely axiomatisable theory, P the list of predicates occurring in S, then CIRC[S; P ] picks out the minimal model of S if there exists one.
13 From a computational point of view, this has the disadvantage that one still needs a mechanism to determine what follows from the circumscribed theory, which is in general second order. On the other hand, if one uses logic programming, one has a computational mechanism which computes the atomic formulae true in the minimal fixed point of the consequence operator (and perhaps more complex formulae as well). The downside of this is that the consequence operator associated to a logic program S need not have a unique fixed point, so that, in general, the completion of S (which is first order) does not define the minimal model, unlike CIRC(S). But, still speaking generally, the least fixed point need not be recursive, although it is recursively enumerable, hence circumscription does not hold an advantage over logic programming here. More importantly, we shall see that in many cases of interest, the least fixed point is unique and computable, and hence that constraint logic programming delivers all that one could want.
4.
1. An example. Consider the sentence (15) 'John is crossing the street.'
The verb phrase 'cross the street' is an accomplishment, hence to specify its meaning one needs an activity, something that changes under the (causal) influence of that activity, a culminating event, and the resulting end-state. These are all introduced and connected in the following scenario, which also contains episodic information relating to the situation at hand.
HoldsAt(distance(m),t)∧HoldsAt(crossing,t)→ Happens(reach,t) (8) Initiates(start,crossing,t) (9) x < m → Releases(start,distance(x),t) (10) Initiates(reach,other-side,t) (11) Terminates(reach,crossing,t) (12) HoldsAt(distance(x), t) → Initiates(reach,distance(x),t)
The scenario scen consists of 4-12. The dynamics dyn consists of 1.
We now discuss the relation of this scenario to the meaning of the progressive form in English. The literature on the progressive is voluminous, so we have to be very brief; a more satisfactory discussion, including references, can be found in [6] . We basically follow Dowty's analysis in [2] which characterises the progressive by means of a default entailment: 'John is crossing the street' is true now if (a) John is now crossing, and (b) 'John will have crossed the street' is true in all inertia worlds, that is, in all possible worlds which are identical to the actual world up to the present time, and which in the future develop in ways 'most compatible with the present course of events', to quote Dowty. Thus, Dowty attempted to characterise the progressive by means of its entailments. The description of inertia worlds is only a gesture toward a definition, but a satisfactory definition can be obtained using the minimal models furnished by constraint logic programming. We will come back to the proposed characterisation of the progressive after some pertinent technical results.
If scen contains everything we know about the situation, we would like to be able to derive that John will get to the other side eventually. Let RCF denote the axioms for the theory of real-closed fields. We then have Theorem 3. For s > t 0 : RCF + comp(scen + dyn + EC) |= HoldsAt(otherside,s + m).
Proof. The premisses uniquely determine a model to be of the form:
(1) crossing holds in the interval (t 0 , t 0 + m], and is false outside this interval (2) distance(0) holds on [0, t 0 ], distance(x) holds at t 0 + x, for x ≤ m, and distance(m) holds after t 0 + m (3) start happens at t 0 , reach at t 0 + m (4) one-side holds before (and including) t 0 , and is false thereafter (5) other-side holds at and after t 0 + m, and is false at other times. Now consider the sentence (16) John was crossing the street, when the truck hit him.
(16) leads to the following additions to the scenario 13 for some r, t 0 < r < t 0 + m, Happens(hit,r) 14 Terminates(hit,crossing,t). Now Clipped(t 0 ,crossing,t 0 + m) becomes derivable, and theorem 3 is no longer true, although one can still compute an interpretation for crossing.
Let us now consider the question whether the interpretation for the progressive proposed here is in fact correct. The anonymous referee asked whether it is not more correct to say that 'John is crossing the street' leaves it entirely open whether he will make it, and pointed out that, also according to Dowty, the progressive of an impossibility is never true. This is also the case in our set-up, because scenarios must be consistent. Furthermore, the assumption is always that a scenario contains all of one's knowledge pertaining to a given situation. Thus, the default inference should be interpreted, as the referee indeed suggests, as an inference from 'John is F -ing' to 'For all one knows, John will F '.
Coming back to our main theme, we see that what is constant across situations is the algorithmic content of 'cross the street', not its meaning in the sense of denotation.
We will now turn these considerations into a definition. In the example, one may distinguish between general properties of a situation of 'crossing the street' and formulas fixing parameters of the situation. In the original situation, all formulas except 2, 3 and 6 are general (one has to replace m by a variable in 7). Let us call this the lexical component of 'cross the street'. Formulas fixing parameters are 2, 3 and 6. In addition, we need as input a parameter for the width of the street. In the expanded situation, formulas 13 and 14 are added. Let us call this the episodic component of 'cross the street', or episode for short. An episode thus contains formulas and a substitution of ground terms for certain variables. We may then formulate Definition 15. The sense of an expression is the constraint logic program (in the sense of CLP (T )) representing the lexical component, viewed as an algorithm which transforms an episode into the denotation of the expression in a model, using the axioms of the event calculus.
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The question then arises, what these denotations look like. The definition is a bit vague on this, as it speaks about 'a model'. We know however that models computed by a logic program are in a sense minimal. It turns out that the denotations in such a minimal model must always be of a very simple form, which matches well with intuition.
Structure of the models
The main mathematical question raised by the preceding definition is thus to determine what is the structure of a denotation computed by the above recipe; or, more precisely, how the scenario, the dynamics and the axioms of the event calculus jointly affect the structure of the denotation. To our knowledge, this question has not been investigated in any detail in the relevant AI literature. In the example the scenario determines a unique model, i.e. there is a unique fixed point of the three-valued consequence operator (which is moreover reached in finitely many steps). The model obtained is actually a two-valued model, and the fluents without parameter, crossing, one-side and other-side are represented by finite sets of intervals. To describe the structure of the fluent with a real parameter, distance(x), one needs the more general notion of a semialgebraic set:
Definition 16. A subset of IR n is semialgebraic if it is a finite union of sets of the form {x ∈ IR n | f 1 = . . . = f k = 0, g 1 > 0. . . . , g l > 0}, where the f i , g j are polynomials.
Observe also that the events (start and reach) mark the beginning and end of fluents. The structure of the model is thus very similar to that of the canonical model of the event calculus given in section 3.
The question is how far this generalises. Intuitively at least, fluents corresponding to natural language expressions (e.g. verbs) are semialgebraic, and we would like this to fall out of the set-up, without further stipulations. In natural language semantics it is a contested issue whether the fundamental temporal entities are points or intervals. The event calculus neatly sidesteps this issue, by taking the basic entities to be events and fluents, which are not explicit functions of time and which can be interpreted on structures with very different ontologies for time. Even if we take the structure underlying time to be IR, that does not constitute an ontological commitment to points. Ontological commitment is generated rather by representation theorems, which correlate the events and fluents with point sets in a given structure. It may then very well turn out that, even when time is taken to be IR, fluents and events can be represented as sets of intervals, so that points have no role of their own to play. The situation is slightly more complicated in the case of fluents admitting real parameters, for example fluents representing possibly changing partial objects. Again speaking intuitively, one would expect change to be continuous, with at most a finite number of jumps. The kind of change it is possible to program depends on the one hand on the constraint language chosen, on the other hand on the constraint logic program. Now in RCF only semialgebraic sets can be defined; but would it be possible to extend the range of definable sets by a constraint logic program to RCF ?
The next few theorems give some pertinent results. This material leans heavily on [17] . 15 In this paper we deal only with the case where fluents do not to contain predicates from the event calculus, so that we need not use the program for the truth predicate.
Definition 17. A finite branch in a computation tree is successful if its last node contains a constraint only. A finite branch is finitely failed if its last node is of the form ?c , G (G nonempty) with no more resolution steps possible. A query ?c, G is finitely evaluable if all branches in a derivation tree starting from ?c, G end either in success or in finite failure.
Theorem 4. Let RCF be the theory of real-closed fields. Let P = EC + scen + dyn and ?G a finitely evaluable query in the language of the event calculus. Then there exists a semialgebraic set c such that RCF +comp(P) |= ∀(G ↔ c).
Proof. We do not quantify over events or fluents, hence the predicates of the event calculus, even when they contain constants for objects, fluents or events, can be thought of as interpreted only on the constraint domain, in this case a real-closed field. Thus, the machinery of constraint logic programming is applicable. By hypothesis the computation tree whose top node is ?G is finite, hence those terminal nodes which are not marked as failures are marked by a constraint from the language of real-closed fields. It then follows from lemma 7.3 in [17] together with quantifier elimination for real-closed fields, that G represents a semialgebraic set. Corollary 1. Let P = EC + scen + dyn. If for all fluents f (x) in the scenario and dynamics, the query ?HoldsAt(f (x), t) is finitely evaluable, the theory RCF + comp(P) has a unique model (modulo the underlying realclosed field), which is obtained after finitely many iterations of the consequence operator. In this model the primitive predicates are also represented by semialgebraic sets.
Proof. Since the scenario is finite, it mentions only finitely many fluents (possibly containing parameters for reals or individuals). Every predicate is determined once the interpretation of HoldsAt is fixed. Since the computation tree for ?HoldsAt(f (x), t) is finite, by the previous theorem RCF + comp(P) implies that HoldsAt(f (x), t) is equivalent to a constraint. Theorem 7.1 in [17] shows that the interpretation of HoldsAt(f (x), t) is then determined by finitely many iterations of the consequence operator Φ P . (This is nontrivial, since the consequence operator applies to ground atoms, and the domain is infinite.) By definition of scenario and dynamics, in RCF + comp(P), every primitive predicate can be defined in terms of HoldsAt and relations and functions from the constraint language L, and hence in terms of semialgebraic sets only. It then follows from Stuckey's completeness theorem 8.4 that the least fixed point of Φ P is reached after finitely many iterations. Since given RCF + comp(P) all predicates have semialgebraic definitions, the least fixed point is the only fixed point. A structure is a model of RCF + comp(P) iff it is a fixed point of Φ P , hence it also follows that the model determined by the answer to the queries ?HoldsAt(f (x), t) (for each f ), is a model of RCF + comp(P), and the unique model. Corollary 2. Let P = EC + scen + dyn. The following are equivalent:
a any model of RCF + comp(P) is completely determined by its restriction to RCF ; b HoldsAt(f (x), t) is semialgebraic.
Proof. The direction from (a) to (b) follows from the previous corollary. The converse direction follows from Beth's definability theorem and quantifier elimination for real-closed fields.
The hypothesis of finite evaluability of ?HoldsAt(f (x), t) is rather strong, although satisfied in the example given. In principle one can determine HoldsAt(f (x), t) completely by starting up derivations from both ?HoldsAt(f (x), t) and ?¬HoldsAt(f (x), t) and stop when the collected answer constraint in one tree is the complement of that in the other; the trees may then still contain branches which are neither successful nor failed. Let us call this notion essential evaluability.
Theorem 5. Let RCF be the theory of real-closed fields. Let P = EC + scen + dyn and ?G a query in the language of the event calculus such that ?G is essentially evaluable. Then there exists a semialgebraic set c such that RCF +comp(P) |= ∀(G ↔ c).
Proof. Along the same lines as that of theorem 4, replacing lemma 7.3 in [17] by theorem 7.4.
There is also a corresponding completeness result.
Theorem 6. Let P = EC + scen + DYN. The query ?HoldsAt(f (x), t) is essentially evaluable if RCF +comp(P) |= ∀t (HoldsAt(f, t) ↔ c(t)) for a constraint c.
¬Initially(f ), ¬HoldsAt(f, 0), Happens(e, 0) and Initiates(e, f, 0), and will assign u to all other ground instances of (¬)HoldsAt. S is of course blatantly circular, but all interesting programs involve some sort of cycle; cf. formulas 1 and 12 in the example of section 4.1. However, at present we have no idea how to isolate the scenarios which exhibit the completeness properties of corollary 2.
The minimal models of scenarios may thus be partial 16 . How bad this is, depends on the kind of question one wants the scenario to answer. When one wants to know whether some fluent f holds at a particular time t 0 , it suffices to find a constraint c such that c(t 0 ) and the query ?c, HoldsAt(f, t) is successful. This may be a fairly local question. On the other hand, asking whether some event will ever happen, may involve computing an entire model, and in that case it may be unfortunate not to know whether the answer to the query is just around the corner, or whether the scenario is essentially incomplete.
Although it would be pleasant to have a theorem indicating which programs of the type introduced here lead to terminating computations, in general partiality seems to be an inherent feature of natural language: there is no reason why the lexical and episodic information embodied in the scenario is sufficiently exhaustive to make the scenario coplete. In a sense it is gratifying that partiality is a consequence of the present approach to meaning, and does not have to be built in. It should be noted in this context that the use of Kleene's three-valued logic is not essential. There exist general techniques to transform three-valued structures into two-valued structures, essentially through replacing each predicate A by a pair (A,Ā) consisting of the positive and negative part of A. For logic programming, this has been elaborated by Stärk in [16] .
Conclusion
The main conceptual difference between the approch to linguistic meaning advocated here and Moschovakis' notion of meaning concerns the rôle of the lexical component in the semantic architecture. In Moschovakis' approach the basic meanings are more or less given by the structure A. The phrase more or less means that there may very well be words with complex sense; the German word Sonnenschutz (sun protection) 17 may be an example of a lexical item with complex sense. Neglecting such examples the lexical component of semantics is given by structure A. This is in accordance with Montague's general program for semantics (see [10] .). The task of structural semantics is to build new meanings on the basis of given (lexical) meanings. 16 Essentially so, when the program for the truth predicate is added. 17 There may however be serious compositionality problems with examples like this.
The word Sonnenschutz means protection from sun but certainly the word Arbeitsschutz (industrial safety) does not mean anything like protection from work but protection from losing work.
Semantic relations between between items which cannot be further analysed have to be specified in a rather ad hoc way by meaning postulates 18 . Moschovakis' major achievement from a linguistic point of view is his novel explication of the Fregean notion sense which emphasises the computational aspect of this concept. His account is certainly superior to any account based on possible worlds both for conceptual and empirical reasons.
To see how the approach to linguistic meaning advocated in this paper differs from Moschovakis' theory consider again the following formula.
HoldsAt(f 1 , now ) ∧ ∀t(HoldsAt (f 2 (g(t) ), t) → ∀d > 0Trajectory(f 1 , t, f 2 (g(t + d)), d)).
This formula, which we took to be part of the dynamics, characterises the common semantic feature of a class of verbs, i.e. the class of accomplishments. It applies to both crossing a street and drawing a circle and distinguishes these expressions from activities like pushing a cart. But this is certainly not a sufficiently fine grained analysis of the meaning of accomplishments since crossing a street and drawing a circle clearly differ in meaning. The first involves information about say the width of a street the second information about the radius of a circle. This additional lexical information is provided by a specific scenario. Both the general characterisation of accomplishments given by the formula above and the specific scenario are involved in the computation of denotations in a prefered model. Although the lexical information expressed in scenarios may be rather idiosyncratic it nevertheless finds a systematic place in this computational process. To summarise, the common feature of Moschovakis' approach to linguistic meaning and the approach advocated in this paper is their emphasis on the computational aspect of the notion sense. The difference is that here Moschovakis' approach is radicalised, and also taken to apply at the lexical level. Moschovakis also provides a reduction calculus and a decidable criterion for identity of intensions. This we have not yet been able to do. While the definition of scenario (11) provides a kind of normal form for intension, a full theory of identity of intensions in this context would require us to tackle the notoriously difficult problem of equivalence of logic programs. 
